The literature on staggered privatization sales suggests that governments can effectively signal commit ment to not expropriate the future rents of privatized firms. The privatization of telephone firms around the world provides an excellent opportunity to test this theory. Using a sample of repeated privatization sales I test whether governments can effectively signal commitment by selling ownership gradually and transferring managerial control immediately. The use of panel data with fixedeffects provides consis tent estimates when commitment is not observed and timeinvariant. Unobserved commitment is ren dered timeinvariant by using repeated sales within a government administration, typically within two years. The results cast doubt on the ability of governments to effectively signal commitment and in crease the market value of firms in privatization sales. These results hold for several signals tested.
Introduction
Governments selling stateowned enterprises face the challenge of how to signal poten tial investors that they are committed to not expropriate the future firm's profits. According to , in the presence of asymmetric information between the issuer of stock (a government) and potential investors 1 , "The structure of the sale may be used to reassure investors: a partial sale and (possibly) its underpricing are signals of commitment. Gradual sales (with immedi ate transfer of control) imply that the government is willing to bear residual risk, a signal that it does not intend to redistribute value through a future shift in policy". (Perotti, 1995: 848) .
Several authors had tested Perotti's predictions with various degrees of success. These studies typically use data from privatization sales in several industries and in dif ferent countries spanning a period of ten to twenty years. Most studies find that under pricing is prevalent in privatization initial public offers (Perotti and Guney, 1993; Perot ti, 1995; Dewenter and Malatesta, 1997; Jones et al., 1999; Bel, 2002; Bel, 2003; Su, 2003; and Florio and Manzoni, 2004) . A second finding is that the degree of underpric ing appears to be more pronounced in earlier sales (Perotti and Guney, 1993; Bel, 2002; Bel, 2003; and Su, 2003) . This is interpreted as supporting the hypothesis that govern ments build credibility (commitment) through time as suggested by Perotti and Guney (1993) and .
Contradictory evidence has been found on whether a small initial offer signals commit ment as suggested by the signalling hypothesis. Jones et al. (1999) find that small initial of fers leads to less underpricing which is consistent with signalling model. However, Dewenter and Malatesta (1997) , Bel (2002) and Bel (2003) find no effect on un derpricing suggesting that signalling is not effective. Moreover, contrary to the signalling hypothesis, Su (2003) and Florio and Manzoni (2004) find that as the size of the share offer increases underpricing falls 2 .
A common problem with several of the aforementioned studies is that they use proxy variables to control for the unobserved commitment, but this creates an endogeneity prob lem due to unobservable characteristics that makes a government credible 3 . This in turn leads to inconsistent coefficient estimates (see Wooldridge, 2002: chapter 5) .
A second problem is that these studies typically regress underpricing on a set of ex planatory variables such as the size of the share offer, or the equity share retained by a gov ernment as if these were exogenous. According to both underpricing and the size of the share offer are signals of commitment and therefore are choice variables. It seems plausible to assume that the seller (a government) has a revenue target in mind; by setting a price, implicitly a government is setting the quantity of shares to sell and the ex pected underpricing. Thus, a simultaneity problem exist producing inconsistent coefficient estimates.
A third problem is that by using data spanning ten to twenty years these studies implic itly assume that credibility or commitment can be signalled by a country rather than a gov ernment. However, in governments signal commitment, not countries: "Be cause a government cannot commit future governments to its current policy, the model best describes short and mediumterm policy uncertainty." (Perotti, 1995: 850) .
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Can Governments signal commitment in privatization sales? This paper departs from previous studies in several ways. First, its main focus is not to find the determinants of underpricing; rather, it uses observed signals in privatization sales and tests whether signalling was successful. A successful signal will reduce the risk of ex propriation and should increase the market value of a firm. Second, it uses a sample of pri vatization sales in a single regulated industry (telecommunications). This permits the use of industryspecific variables to control for changes in the industry affecting the firm's value. The choice of industry seems appropriate because of the large amount of sunk costs and the high risk of expropriation. Moreover, typically the sale of the government telephone monop olies represented the largest privatization sale in a country. Thus, successfully signalling commitment was especially important. Third, and more important, commitment is treated as unobservable strictly following .
Empirically testing the signalling hypothesis is possible by following Levitt's (1994) ap proach of pairing data in such a way that the unobserved variable (commitment) becomes timeinvariant and then using panel data with fixedeffects to estimate the relevant regres sions. For this end, only repeated privatization sales by a government are included in the analysis 4 .
Finally, unlike previous studies (except Jones et al., 1999) , potential endogeneity prob lems are addressed using suitable instruments and twostage least squares estimation.
The results of panel data analysis with firm fixedeffects cast doubt on a government's ability to effectively signal commitment by manipulating the size of the share offer or by timing the transfer of managerial control as suggested by Perotti and Guney (1993) and Per otti (1995) 5 . Section 2 discusses an econometric approach to overcome the fact that commit ment is not observed; then it specifies the hypotheses to test and describes the data. Section 3 implements the econometric tests and presents the results. Section 4 summarizes and dis cusses the results in light of its lack of support to the signalling hypothesis.
Empirical implementation
Assume for simplicity that each country has one telephone firm and a government sells all its equity in this firm at time t1 and t2. Using framework, the value of firm i sold at time t can be estimated using panel data analysis and the following population model,
where V it is a vector of observations of the value of firm i sold at time t and c i is the time invariant unobserved heterogeneity of firm i including country specific regulations and in stitutions. As long as these are constant between t1 and t2 then they would be appropriately captured in c i . X it is a matrix containing observations of variables that affect the value of a firm. According to , a government can successfully signal commitment by manip ulating the size of the share offer at t1 or by combining a small share offer and the transfer of managerial control in that sale. This in turn would increase V it implying that b > 0 in (1).
A problem with equation (1) is that it cannot be estimated because government commit ment is not observed. One solution is to follow Levitt's (1994) approach. By pairing the data in such a way that the unobservable variable (Committ it ) becomes time invariant equation (1) can be estimated using panel data with fixedeffects. For example, if the sample of privati zation sales only includes repeated sales, that is, sales by a same government, typically with in a twoyear period, then all that is required to render Commit it timeinvariant is to make the plausible assumption that a government's degree of commitment within an administration is timeinvariant 6 . A committed government will not expropriate while a not committed gov ernment will expropriate after the initial sale. By using only repeated privatization sales equation (1) is transformed into,
where the timeinvariant unobservable variable Commit it is eliminated and incorporated into the fixedeffect c i making equation (2) possible to estimate.
To qualify as repeated privatization sales two conditions must apply, (1) the chief exec utive (the president or prime minister) in the country selling firm i at time t1 and t2 must be the same, and (2) the chief executive party's control (or lack of control) of the legislature did not change between t1 and t2. Table 1 provides a summary of the sample of repeated privatization sales of telephone firms. For simplicity only the first two sales are shown 7 . Notice that in all paired sales the same chief executive was in office and no changes on the controlling party in the legislature occurred. With no changes on political preferences, it seems plausible to assume that gov ernment commitment is time invariant. To further strengthen this point, notice in table 1 the relatively short timeframe between repeated sales. The large majority of repeated sales oc curred within a twoyear timeframe, short enough to regard commitment as constant. By using repeated sales an unbiased test of the effectiveness of government's signals on the value of privatized firms can be performed.
The signalling hypothesis suggests first, that committed governments successfully sig nal their type by selling at t1 a small portion of the firm's equity . Second, in privatization initial public offers (IPOs) committed governments may signal their type by underpricing the firm at t1. Third, committed governments enhance their signalling by trans ferring control of the firm at t1 in addition to selling a small share in that sale.
According to , committed governments will always signal and sell their firms over time; it seems plausible to infer that all the repeated sales in the sample belong to governments trying to signal commitment to increase the value of the firms.
A formal test of the implications in involves testing the following hy potheses.
-Hypothesis #1: The value of a firm increases when the first sale is accompanied by the transfer of managerial control.
-Hypothesis #2: The value of a firm increases when the first equity offer is small.
-Hypothesis #3: When the first equity offer is small, the value of the firm increases when the first sale is accompanied by the transferred of managerial control.
Each hypothesis tests the effectiveness of a different signal and implies that b>0 in equation (2). For each signal the following null hypothesis is tested: H 0 : b<0.
Equation (2) is estimated using all the available observations of repeated sales. If the re gressors in (2) were all strictly exogenous ordinary least squares would produce consistent estimates. As it will be discussed in more detail, the signalling variables are potentially en dogenous. Endogeneity may arise if past or current values of V it are correlated with future or current values of the signalling variables (Wooldridge, 2002 (Wooldridge, : 2657 . For example, the cur rent value of V it may affect a government's choice of the size of the share offer. If govern ments target a certain amount of revenue from a sale and observe a fall on V it before the sale, they may increase the size of the share offer to achieve the targeted revenue. Similarly, past values of V it may affect the decision to relinquish control at t1 and thus an endogeneity prob lem arises. To overcome this, twostage least squares is used. The choice of instruments is discussed later.
Data
An original dataset containing 149 privatization sales of the dominant telephone firms in 74 countries is used. These sales took place in the period 19842003. For each sale, data is collected on the firm sold, date of sale, percentage of equity sold, type of sale (IPO, sea soned, private tender), and total sales revenue. The main sources for these data are Privatisation International (monthly) and the Privatisation International Yearbook (annual). Addi tional data on privatization sales are from the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency's database on privatization 8 and from the Economist Intelligence Unit ViewsWire and Country Information online databases. For each firm, data on the type of telephone services pro vided (fixed local telephony, national longdistance, international service and mobile teleph ony) is also included. Data on whether the privatized firms were awarded monopoly rights and the period over which these rights were guaranteed is also gathered. These data were mainly collected from the Economist Intelligence Unit ViewsWire and Country Information online databases, annual reports of these firms, regulator's websites and from the Commis sion of the European Communities.
The firms in the sample are the dominant basic telephony providers 9 . In most cases, by the time of the first sale they had nearly 100 percent market share on basic teleph ony. Most firms provide all three basic telephone services (fixed local telephony, long distance, and international service) and some are also licensed to provide mobile te lephony. Because the analysis uses only repeated sales, the original sample is reduced to 67 sales in 27 countries. The sample of repeated sales includes two countries that sold more than one firm (Argentina and India) and few governments that sold their firms in more than two repeated sales (Finland, Greece, India, Israel, Japan, Mexico, and Portugal).
Data on the government chief executive's party and the party controlling the legislature are from the Database of Political Institutions from Beck et al. (2001) . Data on the chief ex ecutive's identity is from Rulers.org 10 . Country level data on the economy, demographics, and the telecommunications industry are from the World Bank's World Development Indicators and from the International Telecommunications Union's World Telecommunications Indicators online databases. Data on each country's credit rating are from the Institutional Investor's monthly issues.
Econometric model
Equation (2) is estimated using panel data with firmspecific fixedeffects. The fixedef fect captures any timeinvariant factor influencing the value of a firm. For example, it cap tures timeinvariant regulations in telecommunications, a country's institutions, and a gov ernment commitment not to expropriate.
The natural logarithm of the implied value of the firm per person is used as the depend ent variable V it . Because all the share offers are for less than 100 percent, the implied value is obtained by dividing the revenue raised by the size of the share offer (percent of the share capital sold).
Matrix X it includes demographic, industry, and other variables that affect the value of a firm. Table 2 provides a list of variables along with definitions, summary statistics, and sources.
Income is expected to be positively related to V it because as income increases the de mand for telecommunication services should increase along with V it. Two other variables are included to control for the possible effect of age distribution on the demand for telecommu nication services. For example, countries with a large proportion of children may exhibit lower demand for telecom services that an equally populated country with a larger propor tion of adults and elderly population. The level of the NASDAQ index will affect the investor's willingness to pay in a priva tization sale. The NASDAQ index provides a broad measure of market valuation of technol ogy and telecommunications firms. A positive relationship is expected between this index and V it .
Given that the privatized firms were the dominant fixed telephony providers in each country, the number of mobile telephony subscribers per person should also affect V it . To some degree the entry of mobile telephone firms would erode the revenue of the privatized firms and reduce V it . However, increased mobile telephony use can also have a positive ef fect on V it if it increases revenue through interconnection charges. The net effect on V it is ambiguous 11 .
The type of sale may also affect the market value of a firm. Privatization IPOs have been found to be consistently underpriced (Perotti and Guney, 1993; Dewenter and Malatesta, 1997; Jones et al., 1999; Bel, 2002; Bel, 2003; Su, 2003; Florio and Mazoni, 2004) . In addition, Bulow and Klemperer (1996) show that private tenders attract a limited number of bidders and this also tends to depress the sales price 12 .
Therefore, seasoned offers are expected to be positively related to V it and a binary vari able to control for this is included.
Changes on the licenses held by these firms will also affect V it . For example, privatiza tion sales of telephone firms which included a period of monopoly significantly increase the revenue from these sales (Wallsten, 2004; Viani, 2007) . In addition, changes on the mobile telephony licenses held by these firms will also affect V it . For example, just few months be fore the second sale of Sonera in Finland, the government awarded a third generation mobile telephony license (so called 3G license) to Sonera free of charge while in other countries these licenses have been awarded to the highest bidder 13 .
A binary variable is included to control for this and a positive relationship between this variable and V it is expected. No other changes on mobile telephony licenses were observed.
Finally, variables to control for the observance of law and order, and year binary vari ables to control for unobserved changes in the industry are included 14 . A high index of law and order indicates a higher predictability of rules and this should be positively related to V it . The year binary variables may pick up changes in the industry not captured by the other ex planatory variables. In addition, several studies find that privatizations in the early years were more underpriced than those in later years (Perotti and Guney, 1993; Bel, 2002; Bel, 2003; Su, 2003) ; the year binary variables may also capture this regularity.
Except for the number of mobile subscribers per person and the signalling variables, the other righthand variables seem strictly exogenous. A country's number of mobile subscribers per person would violate the strict exogeneity assumptions if past or current values of V it affect the current or future number of mobile subscribers per person. To see why this can happen consider this; in 1988, just few years before the privatization of many large telephone firms, the waiting time for fixed lines in Ghana was 30 years, in Argentina and Jamaica 22 years, and in Poland 12 years (Ambrose et al., 1990:13) . The long waiting time was a reflection of a relatively low V it of the stateowned fixed line providers at that time. Unable to raise enough revenue to serve the unmet demand for telephone services, governments tried to remedy this situation by awarding mobile te lephony licenses to private firms. Therefore, the growth of mobile service in those coun tries was partially influenced by the low past V it of the fixed line provider creating an en dogeneity problem 15 .
The signalling variables are also potentially endogenous. If the government budgetary needs are an important consideration in the choice of the size of the share offer, then a low value of V it before the sale may induce a government to increase the size of the share offer to raise enough revenue to satisfy these needs. For example, in Croatia, the initial plan to sell Hrvatski Telekom (HT) called for the sale of 25 percent of equity with a revenue target of 1 billion dollars to finance the budget deficit. Fluctuating market conditions in 1999 made that revenue target unlikely. In 1999 the Finance Minister, Boris Skegro, announced an increase in the share offer to 35 percent of HT's equity 16 .
In a similar way, the decision to transfer control in the initial offer can also be affected by the value of V it before the sale. A share offer carries more value to the buyer if it conveys managerial control. Thus, a low V it preceding a sale could prompt a government to transfer managerial control in that sale 17 .
Twostage least squares is used to estimate equation (2). Suitable instruments need to be correlated with the endogenous regressor but uncorrelated with V it . The degree of urbaniza tion seems a suitable instrument for the number of mobile subscribers per person. Urbaniza tion affects the cost of building a cellular telephone network. As the proportion of people liv ing in high density areas increase the amount of fixed investment per mobile subscriber should fall 18 . A positive relationship is expected between urbanization and the number of mobile subscribers per person. The firststage regressions (see first specification in appendix A) suggest that this instrument is suitable because its coefficient has the expected sign and is highly significant. In addition, it is highly unlikely for urbanization to affect V it once other variables have been accounted for.
Three signalling variables are used to test the signalling hypothesis: (1) ControlFirst, a binary variable that indicates whether at t1 a government transferred managerial control; (2) Share25First, a binary variable that indicates whether at t1 a government sold a small por tion of the firm's equity; and (3) Share33*ControlFirst, a binary variable that indicates whether at t1 a government made a small share offer accompanied by the transfer of mana gerial control (see table 2 for definitions). The use of these variables implies that govern ments signal in the first sale only. Three alternative variables that allow for the possibility of signalling at t1 or t2 are also tested. For this end the previous signalling variables are slight ly changed to: (1) Control, a binary variable that indicates whether managerial control was transferred at time t; (2) Share25, a binary variable indicating whether a government sold a small share at time t; and (3) Share33*Control, a binary variable that indicates whether at time t a government made a small share offer accompanied by the transfer of managerial control (see table 2 for definitions). Having these two sets of signalling variables adds ro bustness to the tests performed.
The instrument used for these signalling variables is the country credit rating from Institutional Investor. This rating measures how financially constrained is a government and it has been used to assess the risk of default on sovereign debt (Reinhart et al., 2003) . I expect a lower credit rating to be associated with larger share offers or the trans fer of managerial control. A government in financial distress will experience an increase on the cost of raising funds through debt. As issuing debt becomes increasingly expen sive, governments may decide to increase the amount of government assets to sell; that is, the size of the share offer, or surrender managerial control to increase the sales pro ceeds 19 . The firststage regressions indicate that this instrument has the expected sign and is for the most part highly significant (see second, fourth, and sixth specification in appendix A).
Results
We used equation (2) to test the three hypotheses from the previous section using one signal at a time; the results follow. Table 3 shows the results using twostage least squares. Robust standard errors that ac count for heteroskedasticity are reported. Given that some firms were sold in more than two tranches, the possibility of serial correlation in the model's error terms within clusters (firms) was investigated. I used Wooldridge (2002 Wooldridge ( :2823 ) and Drukker's (2003) procedure and found no evidence of firstorder serial correlation within clusters.
Testing the effectiveness of signalling commitment by transferring managerial control
The results indicate that the signalling variable (ControlFirst) is not statistically signif icant. The null hypothesis H 0 cannot be rejected suggesting that governments cannot effec tively signal commitment by transferring control in the initial sale (first and second specifi cations in table 3). A similar conclusion is reached using the alternative signalling variable (Control) which allows for signalling at t1 or t2. Again it suggests that governments cannot effectively signal commitment by transferring control in a sale. These results do not appear to be driven by the use of weak instruments. Appendix A (first and second specifications) report the results of the firststage regressions. As expected, a low country credit rating sig nificantly increases the likelihood of signalling and urbanization significantly increases the availability of mobile telephony. A Hausman test is implemented to determine whether the instrumented variables should be regarded as endogenous (Hausman, 1978; 1983) . The hypothesis that these are exogenous is rejected with 78 percent confidence using the second specification and with 96 percent confidence using the fourth specification (see last row in table 3).
The other variable coefficients have for the most part the expected sign but except for income and receiving a free third generation wireless telephony license, they lack signifi cance. The results seem fairly stable across specifications.
Testing the robustness of results
A set of tests are performed to assess how robust are these results. A binary variable in dicating the existence of a marketoriented government at the time of the first sale is used as an instrument instead of the country credit rating. A marketoriented government is expect ed to be more likely to give up managerial control than centre or left leaning governments. The rationale behind this is that a marketoriented government will be more inclined to do this for ideological reasons. Marketoriented governments are typically more concerned about economic efficiency than centre or left leaning governments. From the Database of Po litical Institutions (Beck et al., 2001) , a binary variable is created which takes the value of one if a government's chief executive (president or prime minister) is categorized as right wing (marketoriented) and zero otherwise. Using this instrument does not change the results (not reported). Again the coefficients of the signalling variables (ControlFirst and Control) are not significant in all specifications.
An alternative instrument for the number of mobile subscribers per person is tested. Instead of the degree of urbanization the number of vehicles per inhabitant was used. This should be correlated with mobiles subscribership and uncorrelated with the value of the firm. The results are unchanged; the coefficients of the signalling variables are not significant (not reported).
Adding the annual growth rate of gross domestic product to the specifications in table 3 leaves the main conclusion unchanged. A similar result is obtained when eliminating the year dummy variables (not reported).
Finally, one may conjecture that committed governments may not need to signal com mitment 20 . If marketoriented governments are committed to no expropriation, then the transfer of managerial control may not be a signal for these types of governments, but just an expression of their desired to maximize revenue from the sale. If this is the case the re sults may be confounding signals with nonsignals. To eliminate this possibility, those sales in which the government was characterized as marketoriented (see table 2 for definition) were excluded (we are assuming these governments were not signalling) and the equations in table 3 were reestimated. The main result is unchanged; the coefficients of the signalling variables are not significant.
Testing the effectiveness of signalling commitment by selling a small equity share
The signalling hypothesis suggests that governments can sell a small equity share in the first sale to indicate that they are willing to share the cost of a future expropriation. Again, equation (2) is estimated using the natural logarithm of the implied value of the firm per person as the de pendent variable. The signalling variable is a binary variable (Share25First) that takes the value of one if the sale is the first repeated sale and the share offer is equal or less than 25 percent of the firm's equity (see table 2). Again, an alternative signalling variable is tested that allows for signalling in any sale. Share25 is a binary variable that takes the value of one if on sale at time t the share offer is equal or less than 25 percent of the firm's equity (see table 2 ). The threshold of 25 percent was chosen because it is a relatively small offer and it provides enough variabili ty across the sample of repeated sales. Different thresholds are tested later. Table 4 shows the results using robust standard errors that account for heteroskedastic ity. Again, the possibility of serial correlation in the model's error terms within clusters (firms) was investigated. Using Wooldridge (2002 Wooldridge ( : 2823 ) and Drukker's (2003) no evi dence of firstorder serial correlation was found.
Both of the signalling variables tested (Share25First and Share25) are not significant. The null hypothesis H 0 cannot be rejected casting doubt on the ability of governments to ef fectively signal commitment by selling small share offers. Again, it is unlikely that these re sults are influenced by the use of a relatively weak instrument (the country credit rating). Using Share25 as the signalling variable, the firststage coefficient of the country credit rat ing (the instrument) has the expected sign and is significant with 80 percent confidence (see the fourth specification in appendix A).
Again, a Hausman test is implemented (Hausman, 1978; 1983) . The hypothesis that the instrumented variables are exogenous cannot be rejected (see last row in table 4).
The other variable coefficients have for the most part the expected sign. Income, monop oly, and a free third generation wireless telephony license significantly increase the value of a firm. The results seem fairly stable across specifications.
Testing the robustness of results
Several tests are performed to assess how robust are these results. Adding the country credit rating squared as an additional instrument does not change the main conclusions (not reported). Again, the null hypothesis H 0 cannot be rejected meaning that governments can not increase the value of the firm by using these signals.
The number of vehicles per inhabitant is used as an alternative instrument for the num ber of mobile subscribers per person. The results are unchanged; the coefficients of the sig nalling variables are not significant (not reported).
I also tested the threshold in the signalling variables for robustness. Reducing this threshold to 15 percent does not alter the main conclusions. The new signalling variables (Share15First and Share15) lack significance indicating again that governments are unable to increase the value of the firm by using these signals (not reported).
Adding the annual growth rate of gross domestic product to the specifications in table 4 does not alter the main conclusion using all three specifications. A similar result is obtained when eliminating the year dummy variables (not reported).
Finally, it may be plausible to question the endogeneity assumption of the signalling variables (Share25First and Share25); especially in IPO privatizations when the size of the share offer is fixed in advance 21 . The relatively high pvalues obtained in the Hausman test supports this conjecture. Therefore, assuming the signals are exogenous, the equations in table 4 were estimates using ordinary least squares. The main results do not change; the null hypothesis cannot be rejected indicating that governments are unable to increase the value of a firm by using these signals (not reported).
Testing the effectiveness of signalling commitment by selling a small equity share and transferring control in a sale
A third signalling device suggested in the literature is that governments can sell a small eq uity share in the first sale and transfer managerial control immediately to signal commitment. Again, equation (2) is estimated with the natural logarithm of the implied value of the firm per person as the dependent variable. The signalling variable is a binary variable that takes the value of one if the sale is the first repeated sale, the share offer was equal or less than 33 per cent of the firm's equity, and the government transferred control in that sale (see table 2). In creasing the threshold to 33 percent was necessary because there is little variation in this vari able and for lower thresholds the variation was even less. This variable takes the value of one in only four observations out of 61. The choice of the threshold is tested later for robustness. Table 5 shows the results using robust standard errors that account for heteroskedastic ity. Again, no evidence of firstorder serial correlation within clusters was found. The sig nalling variable (Share33*ControlFirst) again is not statistically significant meaning that governments were unable to use this signal to increase the firm's value. Like before, a sec ond signalling variable is tested to allow for signalling in any sale. This time the binary sig nalling variable takes the value of one if at time t the share offer is equal or smaller than 33 percent and the sale involves a transfer of managerial control (Share33*Control). Again, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. These results are unlikely to be influenced by the use of weak instruments. The firststage regression coefficients of these instruments have the ex pected sign and are statistically significant when using Share33*Control as the signalling variable (see the fifth and sixth specifications in appendix A).
Again a Hausman test is implemented (Hausman, 1978; 1983) . The hypothesis that the instrumented variables are exogenous cannot be rejected.
The other variables have for the most part the expected sign; income, monopoly, and the free award of a third generation wireless telephony license significantly increase the value of a firm.
Testing the robustness of results
Several tests are performed to assess the robustness of these results. A binary variable denoting a marketoriented government is used as an instrument instead of the country cred it rating. For ideological reason a marketoriented government would be more likely to trans fer managerial control than a left or centre leaning government. Using this instrument does not change the results (not reported). The number of vehicles per inhabitant is used as an alternative instrument for the num ber of mobile subscribers per person. The results are unchanged; the coefficients of the sig nalling variables are not significant (not reported).
The threshold of the signalling variable is also tested; reducing it to 25 percent does not alter the main conclusion. The new signalling variable lacks significance indicating that gov ernments are unable to increase the value of the firm by signalling (not reported).
Adding the growth rate of gross domestic product to the specifications in table 5 does not alter the main conclusion. A similar result is obtained when eliminating the year dummy variables (not reported).
Another test originates if one questions the endogeneity assumption of the signalling variables (Share33*ControlFirst and Share33*Control); especially in IPO privatizations when the size of the share offer is fixed in advance. The relatively high pvalues of the Hausman test supports this conjecture. Assuming the signals are exogenous, the equations in table 5 were estimated using ordinary least squares. The main results do not change; again the signalling variables lack significance (not reported).
Finally, one may conjecture that committed governments may not need to signal com mitment 22 . If marketoriented governments are committed to no expropriation, then the transfer of managerial control (with the sale of a small equity share) may not be a signal for these types of governments, but just an expression of their desired to maximize the firm's value in the sale. If this is the case the results may be confounding signals with nonsignals. To eliminate this possibility, those sales in which the government was characterized as mar ketoriented (see table 2 for definition) were excluded (we are assuming these governments were not signalling) and the equations in table 5 were reestimated. The main result is un changed; the coefficients of the signalling variables are not significant.
Conclusions and discussion
The sale of the large stateowned telephone monopolies was typically the largest priva tization sale in a country. For example, in 1994 the government of Peru raised the equiva lent of ten percent of the national debt by selling 35 percent of the equity in two telephone monopolies. This, along with the large sunk costs and regulatory uncertainty make these sales especially suitable to test the signalling hypothesis.
The use of repeated sales by a same administration permits the estimation of consistent coefficients when commitment is unobserved. This is because unobserved commitment is timeinvariant and captured as a fixed effect in the panel data regression models. Repeated sales were typically undertaken within a twoyear period with no visible changes in the ma jority in the legislature, and with no changes on the chief executive (president or prime min ister). In such a narrow time frame within a politically stable environment, unobserved com mitment is plausibly regarded as constant.
The results of panel data estimation with fixed effects suggests that governments are un able to successfully signal commitment (and increase the value of a firm) by using three common signals suggested in the literature. These results hold with alternative signalling variables, instruments, and specifications.
The lack of support to the signalling hypothesis begs some explanation. A key assump tion in the signalling hypothesis is that committed governments care about maximizing the value of the firms privatized. Committed governments are treated as value maximizing share holders. In reality elected officials have a multiplicity of factors they care about and value maximization of partially or fullyowned state enterprises may not be salient. Value maxi mization cannot explain why after the partial sale of stateowned telephone firms, govern ments continued to subsidize the prices of residential telephone services (or rural telephony) with this subsidy being paid by business users. This however, should not obscure the fact that committed governments would like to signal that they are committed and in fact try to do so in many ways. Unfortunately, some ways of signalling commitment such as having in stitutions that protect private property and the enforceability of contracts are long term de velopments that cannot be addressed by a single administration. Moreover, the time horizon for investors in these industries far exceeds the possible duration of an administration. In these cases, institutions that remain once the administrations are gone (captured as fixed ef fects) may be far more important than the signals suggested in the literature.
Notas
1. The issuer knows whether it is committed to not expropriate a firm's profits but this cannot be observed by potential investors.
2. Florio and Manzoni (2004) used the equity share retained by the government and insiders.
3. Some proxies include a dummy variable to control for sales after a certain year, the order of each sale within a country's privatization program, and an index of economic freedom. The rationale for using these proxies is that countries build credibility through time and that economically freer countries tend to be more credible.
4. Repeated sales may include private tenders, initial public offers, and seasoned public offers. In a private ten der a government announces the sale of part of its equity share in a stateowned enterprise and specifies the terms of the tender offer. After this, each firm submits a technical proposal along with projections of telephone network expansion, quality of service indicators, and any other projection required by the government. The qualifying bidders then enter the final stage in which a block of shares is awarded to the highest bidder. Pub lic share offers are different because the government sells a given amount of shares using underwriters to place a fixed amount of shares at a fixed price using the stock market.
5.
Note that the signalling hypothesis tested refer to ex-ante signals when commitment is not observed. This is entirely different than the argument advanced by Perotti and van Oijen (2001) where commitment is observed through time by sustained sales of government enterprises. In that case commitment is observed ex-post by government actions.
6. For example during Carlos Menem administrations in Argentina, the degree of commitment to not expropri ate is assumed constant. However, commitment is not assumed constant across two different administrations; that is, between Carlos Menem and his successor Fernando de la Rua.
7. Some governments sold these firms in more than two sales. The regression analysis uses all available obser vations of repeated sales.
8. Available at http://www.fdi.net/
Resumen
La literatura sobre privatizaciones graduales sugiere que los gobiernos pueden enviar señales creíbles a los inversionistas de un compromiso de no expropiar las ganancias de las empresas privatizadas. La privatización de las empresas estatales de teléfonos alrededor del mundo proporciona una excelente oportunidad para poner a prueba dicha teoría. Usando una muestra de transacciones repetidas se puso a prueba la efectividad de los gobiernos para enviar señales creíbles a los inversionista de un compro miso de no expropiación mediante la venta gradual y la transferencia del control de la empresa de ma nera inmediata. Mediante el uso de regresiones de efectos fijos con datos de panel se obtuvieron esti mados consistentes cuando el compromiso de no expropiar es imposible de observar debido a que este es constante en el tiempo. Se aseguró un compromiso de no expropiación constante debido al uso de ventas repetidas de la misma empresa efectuadas por la misma administración gubernamental, típica mente dentro de un periodo de dos años. Los resultados ponen en duda la habilidad de los gobiernos para enviar señales creíbles de un compromiso de no expropiación y efectivamente aumentar el valor de las empresas en las privatizaciones. Los resultados son robustos para varias señales probadas.
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